CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)

Colonel H. J. Lemley, Jr., USA (G-2) Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)

Colonel Willis B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)

Colonel John E. Leary, USA (JIG)

SUBJECT

NIE 11-13-55: Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Summit Conference

- 1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on Tuesday, 16 August.
 - 2. A tentative schedule for this paper follows:

Oral contributions due	7 September
Staff draft to Board	15 September
Board draft to IAC representa-	19 September
tives	
IAC representatives begin	26 September
meetings	*
IAC representatives complete	29 September
action	,
IAC meets	4 October

PAUL A. BOREL Acting Assistant Director National Estimates

Distribution "B"

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L ☐ DECLASSIFIED CLASS, CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DAT AUTH: HR 70

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 August 1955

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-13-55: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To assess Soviet Foreign Policy in the light of the Summit Conference.

NOTE

The purpose of NIE 11-13-55 is to review trends in Soviet foreign policy in the light of the evidence provided by the Summit Conference and other developments subsequent to the publication of NIE 11-3-55.

Account should also be taken of the treatment given Geneva in subsequent Communist policy and propaganda statements, and, if the final scheduling of the estimate permits, of developments in connection with Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow. The paper should be confined to a discussion of major trends bearing on Soviet foreign policy.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE NEW SOVIET BEHAVIOR?

- A. What have been the manifestations of this behavior?
- B. How long is the new behavior likely to last?
- C. What are the chief motivations behind the new Soviet behavior and their probable relative weight in influencing Soviet policy?
- D. What are the objectives of the new behavior?
- E. Are the Soviet leaders likely to estimate that continuation of their present "conciliatory behavior," but without any substantial concessions, will be sufficient to achieve their objectives? What substantial concessions, if any, are they likely to make?
- F. In general terms, what manifestations of this attitude are likely (1) within the USSR, (2) within other countries of the Bloc, (3) in relations between states of the Bloc, and (4) in the world-wide Communist movement?
- G. Is the new behavior a temperary tactic or does it imply fundamental policy changes?

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SECRET

- ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES WHICH WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE OCTOBER FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AND IN POSSIBLE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, ARE THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE USSR AT GENEVA LIKELY TO CHANGE, FOR EXAMPLE:
 - A. What are the prospects for the USSR's agreement to German unification, and on what terms?
 - B. Will the Soviets modify their position on security arrangements? Under what circumstances, if any, would they agree to security arrangements in Europe compatible with preservation of NATO in substantially its present form?
 - C. What is likely to be the Soviet position on disarmament?
 - D. What is likely to be the Soviet position on the further development of contacts between the USSR and the West, with respect to: (1) trade, (2) communications, and (3) travel?
 - E. Is the USSR likely to raise any other important issues at the Foreign Ministers Conference or in subsequent negotiations, and, if so, what?
- WHAT EFFECT IS CURRENT SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE LIKELY TO HAVE ON COMMUNIST POLICY 'PD ACTIONS IN THE FAR EAST AND VICE-VERSA?